

SA/RR *per*

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SC 05335/64a

23 APR 1964

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Instructions on File

*Memorandum No. 6236-S*

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Tashkent Airframe Plant No. 84

*Reference: 5279-S-37*

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1. The attached paragraph by paragraph comments on the draft paper about Tashkent Airframe Plant No. 84 are submitted in response to the request by [REDACTED]

2. Also attached is a note for [REDACTED] and copies of all information that we have received from the [REDACTED] visit to the USSR during December 1963. Should additional information be forthcoming, it too will be forwarded.

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Enclosures:

- 1 - Comments on Draft SC 05335/64
- 2 - Ltr to [REDACTED]
- 3 - Information on [REDACTED]  
Visit to the USSR

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Distribution:

Orig. and 2-- Addressee

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ORR:D/F/AS: [REDACTED] 1r (X71111)

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THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT CONTAINS  
CODE WORD MATERIAL

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[REDACTED]

We were happy to learn that [REDACTED] will visit us the first two days in June. We are sorry, however, you are not coming too and that the visit is limited to two days. We would prefer to have him spend at least a week with us if possible.

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We also wish to thank you for giving us the opportunity to comment on the draft working paper on activities of Aircraft Factory No. 84, Tashkent. Our comments have been sent to [REDACTED] for forwarding to [REDACTED]. Wayne also has received copies of all the information available to us from the [REDACTED] visit to the USSR.

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Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

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Distribution:

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ORR:D/F/AS: [REDACTED] lr (X7111)

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SC 05335/64

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Part I

Para. 1 - Tashkent Airframe Plant No. 84 consists of at least three parts which are referred to as Plant A, Plant B, and Plant C. There have been unconfirmed reports that a fourth part, Plant D, may exist.

Para. 2 - We agree quite closely on past production. We carry production as follows:

L1-2	4,500	
Il-14	416	We feel they were produced rather than assembled as stated in the draft.
An-8	200	
An-12	141	As of 31 December 1963


Para. 3 - Agree.

Para. 4 - Agree.

Para. 5 - Agree. We carry about 2,300,000 square feet.

Para. 6 - We agree that new construction is very significant but we view the new construction as an indication of plans to build a larger aircraft. The 1958 to 60 or 61 construction was completed, or nearly completed, close to the time that Cub entered production. The 1963 construction may than be planned for completion when a new and probably larger aircraft is scheduled to enter production.

Para. 7 - Some of the rumors about helicopter production indicated they would be Hare, and several Hare have been seen in the factory area. Only one Hoop has been seen at any one time -- all in all, the argument purporting to confirm factory 84 interest in Hoop is terribly weak. Granted it may indicate an interest but certainly does not confirm it.

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Para. 8 - We attach great significance to this new runway in that it is obvious that the old runway was adequate for Camp and Cub. It is highly unlikely that Hoop, an STOL aircraft, would require more runway than Camp or Cub, therefore there must be plans for a larger aircraft to use the airfield.

Para. 9 - We don't understand the hypothesis that the aircraft expansion is possibly "a precautionary measure to ensure a fully adequate runway for the factory in the future." Wouldn't that imply an aircraft requiring a longer runway? Is it reasonable to build a longer runway for future use if the aircraft for future production needs less runway? We think not. It also seems unlikely that an alternative airport would be situated so close to an airframe plant.

Concurrent production, at one facility of aircraft such as Cub and Hoop, which originated in separate design bureaus, would be unusual, however, at the moment it appears at least possible if not probable. The Camp final assembly building could be used for Hoop and one of the newly constructed buildings could serve for Cub or a larger follow-on aircraft.

Para. 10 - Obviously we feel the evidence is more than tenuous in favor of the larger aircraft.

Appendix B - Hoop

Para. 1 - No comment.

Para. 2 - No comment.

Para. 3 - We do not believe that both of the fuselages were Hoop.

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Para. 1 - No comment.

Para. 2 - We feel Cub production at Voronezh preceded that at Tashkent by 6-9 months. In our view,

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tends to support 1960 production of Cub at Voronezh.

Para. 3. - No comment.

Para. 4 - No comment.

Para. 5 - No comment.

Para. 6 - No comment.

Para. 7 - We agree build-up at both Tashkent and Voronezh is fairly rapid but possible in view of the similarities of the Cemp, Cat, and the Cub aircraft.

Para. 8 - We carry production of six Cub a month, at both Voronezh and Tashkent. This estimate is not out of line with delivery information which we have. The delivery information is as follows:

<u>1962</u>	<u>Tashkent</u>
1st quarter	13
2nd quarter	10 (2 additional Cub from unknown factory)
3rd quarter	3 possibly 5
4th quarter	2
Total	<u>28</u> possibly 32

<u>1963</u>	<u>Tashkent</u>
1st quarter	18 possibly 23
2nd quarter	4 (2 additional Cub from unknown factory)
3rd quarter	9
4th quarter	16
Total	<u>47</u> possibly 54

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<u>1962</u>	<u>Voronezh</u>
1st quarter	2 (possibly 3) (also 9 assumed Cat may have been Cub)
2nd quarter	8 Cat or Cub (2 additional Cub from unknown factory)
3rd quarter	11
4th quarter	11 possibly 14
Total	<u>32</u> possibly 47

<u>1963</u>	<u>Voronezh</u>
1st quarter	10 possibly 12
2nd quarter	6 (2 additional Cub from unknown factory)
3rd quarter	23
4th quarter	15
Total	<u>54</u> possibly 58

Para. 9 - Hoop Production - No comment.

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Para. 10 - No comment.

Para. 11 - Although no evidence exists as to the date of completion of the first Hoop at Plant No. 84, it is possible that the Hoop seen in flight at Tashkent on 16 May 1962 was the first.

Para. 12 - We are inclined to believe that the early Hoop were fabricated at Tashkent and assembled at Lyubertsy.

Para. 13 - See CIA Current Support Brief, CIA/RR CB SC 63-16, SC No.

06783/63, 31 May 63, Secret  for a different interpretation of item

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The fact that a prototype of the An-24 was completed in 1959 and the An-22 had not progressed beyond the prototype construction at stage by November 1962, does give reason to wonder, but the An-24 is undoubtedly easier to manufacture and would be expected earlier. Of course the An-14 too is somewhat behind in appearing even though it is uncomplicated. Perhaps these things, merely indicate that the Soviets are not bound by numerical sequence. One cannot help wondering what happened to An-18 and An-20 along the road. Is the delay of An-22 so excessive when we note that An-8 took about 6 years to develop -- nearly 2 years for construction of a prototype and 2 more before completion of a series production model? Hoop too, has encountered some delay in view of the fact that one was seen at Lybertsy in March 1959 and you have stated (page 5, para. 11) that the Hoop sighted in May 1962 over Tashkent probably "was the first complete one built at Factory 84."

Para. 14 - In support of your theory, we submit that kamov would probably require more assistance from Antonov in the design and construction of a wing than he would in design of a fuselage.

Para. 15 - Item 4  may relate to the article 22 - either

An or Ka.

Para. 16 - We expanded to six per month.

Para. 17 - No comment.

Para. 18 - The antithesis of the last sentence is also conceivable.

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SC-05682-64

17 March 1964

*Don*  
*J. L.*

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Aircraft Factory No. 84, Tashkent

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Attached is a draft of a paper on Aircraft Factory No. 84,  
Tashkent which [ ] would appreciate comments on if  
you feel there are any that need making.

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Enclosure:

As stated above.

*OK 2 plus enclosure to M/AS - 2 April 64*

Approved For Release 2007/03/03 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100190015-9